– En el WSJ, una historia de Crimea. Con mapas, un timeline y fotos. “Crimea’s Challenge“.

– Y en el FT, unos cuantos gráficos interesantes: tipo de cambio, reservas acumuladas de divisas extranjeras, socios comerciales, gas y exposición de la banca. “Ukraine: a few charts to bear in mind“.

Jack Matlock, que fue embajador en Moscú durante la Guerra Fría: “Ukraine: The Price of Internal Division“. Realismo y pragmatismo. Sobre el país y lo que ha pasado. Un párrafo del final: “So far as violating sovereignty is concerned, Russia would point out that the U.S. invaded Panama to arrest Noriega, invaded Grenada to prevent American citizens from being taken hostage (even though they had not been taken hostage), invaded Iraq on spurious grounds that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, targets people in other countries with drones, etc., etc. In other words, for the U.S. to preach about respect for sovereignty and preservation of territorial integrity to a Russian president can seem a claim to special rights not allowed others”.

Keir Giles en el blog de Chatnam House: “Russia Will Take Whatever It Can“. “Russia learned from the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008 that use of military force against neighbours can swiftly achieve foreign policy objectives at little long-term strategic cost”. (…) “Furthermore, based on past performance Russia can confidently expect that any penalties which are imposed will be short-lived. In 2008, the West was incandescent with outrage over the Georgia conflict. The following year, the United States declared a ‘reset’, NATO resumed military contacts and business as usual returned”.

Anatol Lieven: “Why Obama Shouldn’t Fall for Putin’s Ukrainian Folly“. “A century ago, two groups of countries whose real common interests vastly outweighed their differences allowed themselves to be drawn into a European war in which more than 10 million of their people died and every country suffered irreparable losses. In the name of those dead, every sane and responsible citizen in the West, Russia, and Ukraine itself should now urge caution and restraint on the part of their respective leaders”.

María Snegobaya: “How Putin’s worldview may be shaping his response in Crimea“. “Why did so few western policy analysts could predict the invasion? Because they believed that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal is to promote Russia’s world integration and to increase its economic power. Isn’t it the only rational thing to do? Turns out it is not how Putin sees the situation”.

Y cita a algunos de los “filósofos de cabecera” de Putin, nacionalistas de inicios del siglo pasado: Berdyaev, Solovyev o Ilyin.

Alexander J. Motyl en Foreign Affairs: “Putin’s Play.What Happens After Russia Intervenes in Ukraine“. “Putin’s geostrategically irrational muscle-flexing might enhance his legitimacy at home and stabilize the system he built for a while. But, over time, it will be Putinism’s undoing. Imperialist behavior will make Russia a rogue state and Putin persona non grata”.

– Duro editorial del Washington Post: “President Obama’s foreign policy is based on fantasy“.

– Una en español sobre la importancia de la agricultura: “Ucrania, algo más que gas“, de Andrés Rodríguez.