Anne Applebaum: «Russia’s Western enablers«. «But this state of affairs is not inevitable. Without sending a gunship or pressing a reset button, we could change our relationship overnight with the Russian government — and with ordinary Russians — simply by changing our attitude toward Russian money».

The Economist: «Kidnapped by the Kremlin«. «AS YOU read this, 46m people are being held hostage in Ukraine» (…) «Mr Putin expects a slap on the wrist. Sanctions must exceed his expectations. Shunning the G8 summit, which he is due to host in June, is not enough. It is time to impose visa bans and asset freezes on regime-connected Russians (the craven parliamentarians who rubber-stamped their army’s deployment should be among the first batch); to stop arms sales and cut Kremlin-friendly financial firms from the global financial system; to prepare for an embargo on Russian oil and gas, in case Ukrainian troops are slaughtered in Crimea or Russia invades eastern Ukraine. And the West should strengthen its ability to resist the Kremlin’s revanchism: Europe should reduce its dependence on Russian gas (see article); America should bin restrictions on energy exports; NATO should be invigorated».

Ruslan Pukhov: «What Putin Really Wants«. «Mr. Putin’s aim is not a de jure separation of Crimea from the rest of Ukraine. That would be legally problematic and disadvantageous to Moscow in terms of its future influence over Ukrainian politics. The purpose of Russia’s incursion was to obtain the greatest possible autonomy for Crimea while still retaining formal Ukrainian jurisdiction over the peninsula».

Y dice también algo que puede resultar curioso: «The final act in Mr. Putin’s calculated gambit is likely to be a return of Yulia V. Tymoshenko to power. It was, after all, Ms. Tymoshenko, not Mr. Yanukovych, who enjoyed Moscow’s de facto support in the Ukrainian elections of 2010; and in later years, Mr. Putin expressed his strong displeasure with her prosecution by Mr. Yanukovych’s government. Although she was released from prison last month, Ms. Tymoshenko was hardly celebrated by the Ukrainian ultranationalists in control of the Maidan. Now it seems that her hour has arrived».

Dmitry Gorenburg: «The role of the Black Sea Fleet in Russian naval strategy«. Un artículo muy interesante sobre la importancia estratégic apara Rusia de la flota del Mar Negro, su composición, cuán obsoleta está, etc. Con un mapa de las instalaciones militares rusas en la península.

Andrew Wilson: «Tatar Sunni Muslims pose a threat to Russia’s occupation of Crimea«. «There are 266,000 Crimean Tatars in Crimea, over 13% of the local population. They are Sunni Muslim, traditionally pro-Ukrainian, and much better organised than the local Ukrainians, who make up 23% of the population».

Tony Barber: «Crimea: A region divided«. «Pro-Russian separatism emerged in the 1990s under the erratic leadership of Yuri Meshkov, an ardent secessionist, and received financial support from Yuri Luzhkov, then the powerful mayor of Moscow. However, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s president, contented himself with a 1997 deal under which Ukraine authorised the Black Sea fleet to stay in Crimea until 2017 – an arrangement extended in 2010 by Viktor Yanukovich, the ousted pro-Russian president, until 2042».

– Silvia Blanco desde Kiev: «La derrota de las Berkut«. «Vetrov cobra unos 500 dólares al mes (364 euros) al cambio de hace una semana, cuando se hundió la grivna. Es un sueldo decente en un país donde la media es de unos 300 euros. Los agentes iban vestidos de negro. El uniforme y las protecciones se las compraban ellos. “Sólo nos dan las armas, el casco y el chaleco”, dice. Lleva un forro polar negro de Adidas, un pantalón de chándal gris de la misma marca y zapatillas de deporte».

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